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The purpose of this paper is to explore the usefulness of a cognitive
approach to taxpayer compliance. The assumption is made that taxpayers make
compliance-relevant Decisions about reporting, filing, listing income,
claiming deductions, and so forth, and this decision-making metaphor can be
useful as a general model of taxpayer behavior.
The federal government is supported by income taxes. About 53% of
federal tax revenues comes from individual income taxes and another 11% from
corporate income taxes (IRS, 1985, p. 21)% Noncompliance arises in several
basic ways: failure to file a return, underreporting of income (legal or
illegal), overstating deductions, and refusing to pay what is owed. For
1981, the IRS estimated that noncompliance with the tax code created lost
revenues of $81.5 billion, enough to pay the national deficit for that year
(IRS, 1983). Both IRS estimates and survey results of self-reported tax
cheating show that noncompliance increased substantially in the late 1970s
(Kinsey, 1984). There is no question that noncompliance is a serious problem
that creates financial costs and furthers a climate of disrespect,
antagonism, and selfishness in the relationships between citizen and polity.
Recognition of this problem led to the creation of the Taxpayer Compliance
panel at the National Academy of Sciences.
If we consider taxpaying behaviors to be the result of purposive
decision-like cognitive processes, then theories of decision making become
relevant to explaining why taxpayers comply or fail to comply with the tax
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requirements. The basic premise of decision models is that people have
preferences, and choose alternatives so as to achieve preferred outcomes.
I will first describe decision models based on utility maximization,
beginning with concepts of economic rationality. Economists consider utility
theory to be a description of individual behavior, an equilibrium toward
which behavior tends in the long run. Psychologists treat utility models as
a standard or prescription of rational behavior against which actual behavior
is compared (e.g., papers in Kahneman et al., 1982). Considerable research
has been devoted to testing utility models against actual behavior, compiling
characteristic "errors" or "biases" defined in terms of the utility model,
and seeking refinements of the utility model that would better describe the
strategic and heuristic aspects of actual decisionmaking. In the second
section I depart from positivist testing and modification of utility models
and explore what goes on in the minds of taxpayers using a finer-grained
cognitive approach based on an understanding of the operation and limitations
of the human mind. Decision heuristics uncovered by this approach are
discussed, including some new thoughts about hierarchical and inter-temporal
decisionmaking. Research directions are suggested that use the cognitive
approach to pose policy-relevant questions about taxpayer decisions and
behaviors.
UTILITY MAXIMIZING MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
ExDected Utility
The standard economic model specifies that decisions maximize expected
utility. The expected utility of any decision alternative is assessed by
identifying the possible consequences or outcomes, assigning a desirability
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or utility to each outcome, and attaching likelihoods to uncertain outcomes..
Each outcome is multiplied by its likelihood and the weighted or discounted
outcomes are summed to create the expected utility of that alternative. The
alternative with the most favorable expected utility is then selected and
implemented.
Let us consider a taxpayer who is considering an illegal deduction of
$100 and judges the probability of audit to be 5%. If audited, the taxpayer
would have to pay the $100 plus a penalty of 50% of the taxes owed ($50). If
we ignore interest rates and treat the taxpayer as risk-neutral, then the
expected utility analysis would involve two alternatives: (1) not taking the
deduction, in which case the result is some current wealth state W, and (2)
taking the deduction, which can result in two outcomes -- W plus $100 if the
taxpayer is not audited, and W minus $50 if the taxpayer is audited. The
expected utility of being honest is simply U(W), and the expected utility of
cheating is .95[U(W+100)]+.05[U(W-50)]. For the risk-neutral taxpayer, we
can assume that U(W)=O and U(W+X)=X for convenience, and the result is that
the expected utility of being honest is 0, compared to 92.5 for cheating.
The taxpayer therefore cheats.
The expected utility formulation allows for risk attitudes to be
represented in the shape of the utility function. A concave shape implies
risk aversion (actually, the concave shape confounds risk-aversion and
diminishing marginal return for money, Schoemaker, 1982). A risk-averse
person would refuse a fair bet such as a coin toss for $1, because the added
utility of the extra dollar is smaller in magnitude than the subtracted
utility of losing. A convex shape represents risk-seeking, and such a person
would take the bet because the possible added utility is greater than the
equally-possible subtracted utility. It is possible to generate an
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extremely risk-averse utility function that would lead the potential tax
cheat above to comply, even though he or she has only a 5% chance of being
audited and faces a relatively small loss.
The same kind of analysis has applied the normative economic model to
criminal behavior (e.g., Becker, 1968). Failure to comply with the tax laws
can be considered as a form of criminal behavior. Criminal behavior, and
property crimes in particular, have been viewed by many social scientists as
a rational act resulting when individuals evaluate the expected utility of
both criminal and noncriminal activities, and then choose the alternative
with the highest net payoff. Thus, if the gains of tax cheating or any form
of criminal behavior outweight the risks, then people should cheat on their
taxes or commit the appropriate crime. This viewpoint suggests that tax
cheating could be deterred by increasing the risks involved (e.g., more
surveillance, harsher penalties, e.g., Blumstein, 1983).
Extending the Utility Model
The same analysis is able to accomodate other, nonmonetary consequences
associated with each alternative. For example, being honest may carry
positive self-evaluations (pride) or negative self-evaluations (feeling like
a sap, regret), whereas cheating may make a person feel competent and
stimulated if they succeed, or guilty and anxious if they are caught. Other
consequences such as the regard of friends, reputation, going to jail, losing
one's job, and becoming a tax consultant can be accomodated by assigning them
a utility (either a monetary equivalent or a satisfaction score). The
consequences do not even have to involve self-interest: there could be
positive utility assigned to the use of one's money by the government to
provide services, or to the moral impact of a "tax revolt" on wasteful
government spending (cf. Sears & Citrin, 1985). In such a way all
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consequences are made measurable and commensurable, without changing the
underlying logic of calculating expected utility. A more complicated
analysis considers that these outcomes may be different in kind, requiring a
multiattribute utility (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). Instead of a single utility
dimension, there is instead a utility space permitting more complex tradeoffs
and interactions among types of utility.
Utility analyses can also be extended like a decision tree to consider
sequences of probabilistic outcomes. For example, a sophisticated taxpayer
might consider the likelihood of being audited, and the consequences of an
audit might be partially certain (e.g., having to gather records and write
letters) and partially risky (will the IRS disallow a deduction?). If the
IRS disallows a deduction, several outcomes are possible (pay it back, pay it
plus fine, pay it plus large fine, pay it plus go to jail). If more severe
penalties are experienced, there are possible additional consequences such as
public disapproval, loss of friends, loss of business income or job.
Additional choices may reside on branches of this tree, such as the options
available if one is audited and fined (pay the fine, appeal, conceal it from
friends, leave town, etc.). The complete assessment of these complex
scenarios would be quite difficult, and it is not surprising that such
analyses are often the province of professionals called decision analysts who
aid decision makers to structure decision problems and work through to a
conclusion. It is interesting to note that decision analysts consider their
contribution to be the process of structuring and restructuring a problem
rather than the computational aspects of calculating an "answer" (Keeney &
Raiffa, 1976).
Utility-Like Models
Formal utility theories offer axiomatic mathematical justification for
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their structure. However, many other models have been developed that have
some of the same components or structure as the formal models, but lack the
axiomatic basis. These are considered as useful descriptive models of
decision making. We will discuss two families of these utility-like
theories: expectancy theories and policy-capturing.
Expectancy theories propose, as does utility theory, that people seek
desired outcomes and weight these outcomes by their likelihood. For example,
the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) proposes that behavior
is determined by intentions to enact that behavior which arise from two
components: attitude and norms. Attitude toward the behavior is computed in
utility-like fashion as the product of the likelihood that the behavior will
produce a conseqence multiplied by the favorability of the consequence,
summed over all relevant consequences. Norms are also computed in
utility-like fashion as the product of the likelihood that salient referent
others or groups think you should enact the behavior multiplied by the
motivation to comply with their wishes, summed over all relevant referent
others. Relevant consequences and salient referent others are elicited from
groups of respondents using consensus and common sense as criteria for
identification. Although the particular mechanics of the questions and
formulae are different from formal utility theory, the net result is to
propose that people choose behaviors that maximize a combination of expected
personal and interpersonal consequences.
There are many varieties of expectancy theories (see Feather, 1982;
Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) that direct attention to many of the same
variables and have similar multiplicative form. They propose that people are
motivated to perform behaviors that are expected to lead to desirable
consequences. There is no doubt that such theories are good predictors of
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behavior, and that people do generally seek favorable consequences.
Policy-capturing models of decision making predict decisions from linear
combinations of input cues or judgmental dimensions, often using multiple
regression as an analytic procedure for revealing the functional
relationships between cues and decisions (Hammond et al, 1975; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). The weights associated with dimensions, whether
empirically-derived or directly elicited, are considered to represent the
relative importances of the dimensions, or the decision-maker's "policy."
The "dimensions" of policy-capturing models are abstractions or correlates of
the "consequences" of utility theories. For example, in choosing a tax
preparer, policy-capturing models could include cues such as quality of firm,
reputation, and training, which serve as proxies for the consequences of
amount of tax to pay and risk of various penalties.
Whereas formal utility theories begin with the multiplicative model
specified by theory, policy-capturing studies usually begin with a simpler
linear model and typically find that more complex terms (configural
judgments) offer little extra explanatory power. Thus, returning to our
example of a person considering cheating on his tax return, the
policy-capturing approach might first try a model treating penalty and
likelihood of audit as separate dimensions that are weighted and added. An
additional cross-product term would be tested to see if it helped explain
judgments or decisions. In this fashion, studies of the evaluation of crime
opportunities in terms of dimensions of probability and consequences find
additive relationships rather than the multiplicative terms required in
utility theory (Carroll, 1978, 1982).
In considering these various models, the real issue is the extent to
which a particular model is correct in its details and whether any
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discrepancies matter. This depends on what the model is being used for: is
it meant to predict aggregate behavior or individual behavior, or correspond
to the process by which individuals make decisions? Paramorphic models
(Hoffman, 1960) are good predictors but do not reproduce the process or
mechanisms by which the behavior came about. Various combinations of so many
intuitively reasonable predictors are bound to correlate with behavior,
particularly when cues are positively correlated with each other (cf. Dawes &
Corrigan, 1974, on strength of linear model). Rather specific and
data-intensive tests may be necessary to distinguish among models (e.g.,
experiments and functional measurement, Anderson, 1981). For example,
determining whether the combination of probabilities and consequences is
additive or multiplicative might require either lots of well-controlled data
or careful study of the domain where the probability of a consequence reached
zero. A model that predicts everyone cheats a little more when the economy
is worse may predict aggregate tax revenues as well as a model that explains
the outcomes as an increase in specific categories of tax cheaters, but these
models have different policy implications.
Policy Implications
If taxpayers are maximizing utility, then the way to ensure compliance is
to make the expected utility of reporting and paying appropriate taxes higher
than the expected utility of various forms of noncompliance. The deterrence
hypothesis does this by increasing the costs of noncompliance through
surveillance and penalties. For example, Blumstein (1983) argues that the
penalties for overstating deductions or failing to report income are far too
low. If taxpayers perceive a 5% chance of discovery, then discovery should
carry a penalty twenty times the taxes saved to deter a risk-neutral tax
cheat. Other unpleasant consequences could be added on to the discovery
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process, such as public disclosure, seizure of property, nasty audit
examiners, or whatever. Of course, the risk is a full-blown war between tax
cheats, sympathizers, and the government (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1983,
p. 47). More audits, withholding, and reporting requirements, and "Big
Brother" data files that crosscheck taxpayers with reports of income sources,
charities, utility companies, and so forth seem necessary to increase the
risk of detection. However, such tactics may only create a larger
underground economy and less visible ways to cheat (Kagan, 1985). There are
extreme structural changes that would greatly curtail the opportunity for tax
cheating: Making tips or barter non-taxable, eliminating deductions, going
to an all plastic economy (no cash) with central reporting of all
transactions, and so forth.
It is also possible to make tax cheating less beneficial (lower the tax
rates) or to make compliance less costly (simpler forms) and more beneficial
(growing numbers of people feel they are not getting good value for their tax
money, Kinsey, 1984, p. 4).
If we turn our attention to multiattribute utility theories that identify
non-monetary outcomes (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), the question becomes,
"What outcomes are taxpayers seeking or avoiding by complying or not
complying?" It appears, for example, that concepts of fairness are important
to taxpayers and that the tax laws do not jibe with common ideas of
fairness. The same failure to list a cash transaction could be motivated by
greed, a belief that one's taxes are too high, a comparison to others who do
not report such transactions, redress for the imposition of the tax laws, or
simple laziness.
Behavioral Decision Theory
Utility theory posits a high degree of rationality. Taxpayers and tax
cheaters are expected to gather information relevant to risks and benefits,
-9-
and combine this information in a systematic way (e.g., weight the
desirability of outcomes by their probabilities of occurrence and add).
This view of rationality and human behavior has been challenged in the
past several decades by researchers who believe human rationality is severely
limited. Beginning with Simon (1945, 1955, 1957), a field of study has
developed primarily within psychology that examines human behavior as
intendedly rational but limited in attention, memory, and computational
capability. This information processing or cognitive school examines the
ways in which human cognitive functions are limited, the mechanisms for
achieving adequate performance within these limits, and the consequences for
behavior.
March and Simon (1958), March (1978), Fischhoff et al.(1983) and others
have identified assumptions underlying economic utility theories that seem to
require overly rational behavior. First, economists assume that preferences
change slowly relative to incentives. However, decision researchers have
suggested that preferences may be very unstable (Fischhoff et al., 1980), may
be the result of decisions rather than their cause (Festinger, 1957; Weick,
1977), or may stabilize only after considerable experience (Schein, 1978).
Second, utility theory assumes that all alternatives are considered,
evaluated, and compared so that the best can be chosen. However, beginning
with the satisficing rule proposed by Simon (1955), behavioral decision
theorists have suggested that only a limited set of alternatives are
considered, that search may stop when a satisfactory alternative is found,
and that information about each alternative may be evaluated by rules other
than expected utility such as comparison against criteria or some other
noncompensatory strategy (Einhorn, 1970; Montgomery, 1983; Tversky, 1969).
Third, numerous researchers have remarked on the difficulty people have in
dealing with probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although the concept
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of weighting outcomes by probabilities-seems clear in utility theory, the way
people actually respond to probability does not seem to follow the calculus
of probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985).
The rapidly developing literature known as Behavioral Decision Theory is
replete with empirical demonstrations that people violate the assumptions of
economic utility theory (for reviews see, e.g., Slovic et al, 1977; Kahneman
et al, 1982; Hogarth, 1980). For example, there are simple gamble-pairs that
can be constructed in which one gamble offers a high probability of winning a
small amount and the other offers a low probability of winning a large
amount. When asked to bid to play each gamble once, people typically bid
more for the one with a large potential gain. However, when asked to choose
which they would play if they could only play one, they choose the one where
they are most likely to win. Such a discontinuity between choices and bids
is inconsistent with any normative rationality. These errors persist when
people are rewarded with money for good performance (Grether & Plott, 1979)
or whan actual gamblers in Las Vegas casinos play the same gambles on
roulette wheels for real money (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973).
A particularly detailed and applicable use of Behavioral Decision Theory
was a study of the failure to buy federally-subsidized flood insurance
(Kunreuther, et al, 1978). According to utility principles, this insurance
was offered at highly favorable rates, assuming that residents had accurate
risk and cost data and combined them to maximize utility. However, a
national survey of flood-prone areas revealed that residents assessed their
risks and costs differently from the experts. Some of these differences
arose from judgmental biases discussed later. However, even considering
residents' own assessments, those who bought insurance and those who did not
exhibited similar distributions of expected utility. Instead, it appeared
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that residents' purchasing decisions depended on informal decision rules such
as whether neighbors and relatives bought insurance, what their insurance
agent said, and whether they could tolerate another thing to worry over.
Rather than summarize the Behavioral Decision Theory literature, I will
review research on a specifically-relevant domain showing that criminal
behavior is governed by mental processes somewhat different from utility
models.
Behavioral Research on Criminal Decision Making
Conceptually, we may divide the decision process of a potential criminal
into intelligence (information gathering) and choice (use of rules to turn
information into a decision). Several studies have given potential criminals
the information presumed necessary for evaluating a crime opportunity, and
examined the choice rule that was followed. Research that manipulated the
amount of gain, likelihood of gain, severity of punishment, and likelihood of
punishment in hypothetical crime situations found that subjects are sensitive
to these variables but do not combine them into the interaction terms
(representing expected risks and payoffs) necessary for computing expected
utility (reviewed in Carroll, 1982). Carroll (1978) conducted
individual-level analyses and found that responses to the information was
essentially additive. Many subjects focused on only one dimension and either
ignored the others or made minor adjustments based on one or two other
dimensions. Only 41% of subjects were responsive to the likelihood of
capture; 60% to the likelihood of success; 67% to the penalty; and 84% to the
available money. These data suggest very strong "dimensional preferences"
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) and a tremendous difficulty combining multiple
pieces of relevant information into a single judgment. These results are
quite consistent with the decision behavior in other domains such as clinical
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psychology and medicine, where experienced decision makers exhibit
considerable inconsistency, dissensus, and'use of simple additive rules
rather than the complex configural rules that they claim to use (e.g.,
Camerer, 1980; Goldberg, 1970; Johnson et al., 1982).
Other research suggests that potential criminals not only fail to use a
rational choice rule, but also fail to gather appropriate information. The
Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure (1975) studied knowledge of criminal
penalties and concluded, "It appears that knowledge of penalties can not act
as deterrents since these are unknown until after a person has committed a
crime or become a prisoner" (p. 78). Paternoster et al. (1982) report a
panel study showing that behavior more strongly determines perceptions of
risk than perceptions influence behavior. Research on taxpayers also shows
various misconceptions, including overassessments of the likelihood of audit,
and misconceptions about the role of the IRS in tax law creation (Aitken &
Bonneville, 1980; ICF, 1985).
The above studies suggest that potential criminals (and people in
general) are very deficient in their ability to evaluate alternative courses
of action. However, other criminological research suggests that experienced
criminals have a great deal of technical and interpersonal skill and
knowledge relevant to specific crime opportunities. Interviews with
experienced criminals suggest that certainty and severity of punishment are
not static properties of crime, but under partial control of the criminal.
Criminals are expert at controlling or minimizing risk. Thus, it makes
little sense to ask the abstract question, "What is the probability that a
burglar will get caught on a particular attempt?" although statistics exist
to compute such a probability by estimating number of burglaries and burglars
caught. It makes more sense to ask, "How do you keep from getting caught?"
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The criminal's skill in leaving no evidence that will stand up in court, in
manipulating the legal system through bargains and bribes, in setting up and
carrying out crimes and disposing of the gains is indicative that an
experienced criminal faces different opportunities and sanctions than does
and amateur (Inciardi, 1975; Letkemann, 1973). This research is consistent
with studies showing that people will accept risks they consider
controllable, such as driving a car, far in excess of risks they consider
uncontrollable, such as environmental carcinogens (Slovic et al, 1980; Starr,
1969).
This viewpoint is, in fact, consistent with the research on expert
decision making. Experts are viewed as knowing a great deal, but being
unable to apply or combine that knowlege in a sufficiently systematic way.
Thus, "bootstrapping" techniques have arisen for creating decision aids that
utilize expert knowledge but do the combination rule in a mechanical way
(Camerer, 1980; Dawes, 1971; Sawyer, 1966). Johnson (in press) has called
attention to the knowledge experts have of rare events, what are called
"broken leg cues." Broken leg cues are valid but appear very infrequently,
and therefore are difficult to elicit from experts or to detect in a
regression study with samples of decisions. However, they are an advantage
experts have over models of more typical cases.
Carroll (1982) has suggested that research showing that people consider
only one or a few pieces of information at a time and research showing that
criminal behavior seems responsive to complex and multiple factors can be
reconciled by allowing the decision process to be extended over time in such
a way that features are sequentially incorporated into decisions and
behavior. Thus, the criminal uses considerable judgment and knowledge in
evaluating a particular opportunity, but at any one moment is only making
-14-
III
limited use of simple information.
For example, one of Letkemann's (1973) interviewees remarked: "When I was
down to a certain level I would go out" (p. 22). Lack of money was one
factor initiating a search for a good opportunity. Another interviewee
provided a sequential ordering of decision factors:
Usually, the assessment of economic value precedes the assessment of
risk. A safecracker may, while on legitimate business, spot a
particularly "easy" safe. He may then assess the probable economic value
of the safe's contents. Whether the value is high or low, if the risks
are low, he may "make" the safe. On the other hand, if both are high, he
may also attempt the job. (p. 151)
This simple contingent process model (Payne, 1973) can be interpreted as:
(1) assess money in pocket (if high, no crime; if low, go to step 2);
(2) assess certainty of success (if low, no crime; if high, go to step 3);
(3) assess amount of gain (if low, go to step 4; if high, go to step 5);
(4) assess risk (if high, no crime; if low, go to step 5);
(5) commit crime -- a process with substeps involving the planning and
execution of the crime. In comparison with utility theories, the above
decision process is not optimal because it lacks thorough consideration of
alternatives and information, and formal combination of information into an
assessment of each alternative. However, the process is certainly responsive
to the environment and possibly highly effective. Johnson and Payne (in
press) suggest that simple heuristic rules can approximate the decision
quality of the utility rule at a lower "cost" in time and effort.
Clarke and Cornish (in press) and Weaver and Carroll (in press) have
suggested that criminal decision making can further be separated into at
least two kinds or levels of decisions: a decision to enter (or leave) the
role of criminal, which refers to a decision to be open and aware of certain
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events and opportunities, and decisions about specific opportunities. This
corresponds to strategic vs. tactical, or career vs. job choices. For
example, in a study of expert and novice shoplifters, Weaver and Carroll
found that experts make very rapid considerations of specific shoplifting
opportunities, and focus on tactical choices for avoiding detection and
acquiring an item, but do not consider distal consequences such as jail or
social embarassment. Novices take twice as long considering an item and seem
to both reason out tactical choices from scratch and consider more
fundamental issues of the moral, legal, and social consequences of
shoplifting and getting caught. This suggests that experienced shoplifters
not only know more about tactics, but also have made a prior "standing
decision" (cf. Cook, 1981) or "standard operating procedure" (Cyert & March,
1963) that established their willingness to shoplift when suitable
opportunities are found. Those opportunities are then assessed on different
(partially overlapping) characteristics from the prior decision. An
interesting question that we will discuss later is what shifts the decision
process from tactical decisions back to reevaluating the standing decision.
Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) is intended to account for
certain empirical phenomena in risky decision making, typically involving
simple gambles. These phenomena appear to violate the utility-maximizing
model. Errors and biases have accumulated over the years such as the Allais
Paradox, certainty effects, a confusing empirical literature on risk
preferences, and preference reversals induced by trivial shifts in wording
(Hershey et al, 1982; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Hogarth, 1980). Prospect
Theory postulates mathematical choice processes that can account for many of
these phenomena in a parsimonious way.
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Prospect Theory retains the structure of utility theory by including a
utility-like valuing function, a probability-like weighting function, and
the multiplicative computational rule. However, several changes are
introduced into the evaluation phase of utility theory in order to account
for the results of empirical research on decisions: (1) value is
calculated relative to a reference point rather than total wealth
position, allowing the separation of "gains" from "losses"; (2) the shape
of the value function varies with each individual, but the "modal" value
curve is concave in the region of gains and therefore risk-averse, but
convex for losses and therefore risk-seeking, and the loss curve is
steeper than the gain curve; and (3) probabilities are replaced by a
decision weight curve that is discontinuous in shifting from certainty to
risk (producing a "Certainty Effect") and shallow for low probabilities
(resulting in the probability of an event and its complement summing to
less than 1.0). Some of the phenomena utility theory associates with risk
attitudes are explained in the value function, but others are explained in
the decision weights.
The revised evaluation phase in Prospect Theory is only part of its
contribution to the theory of decision making. Before prospects are
evaluated, there is an earlier phase called editing or framing which
defines the domain of alternatives, the outcomes of each alternative, and
sets a reference point. It is in this editing phase that real-world
decisions are transformed into prospects (gamble-like abstractions) and
later evaluated prior to choice.
The implications of Prospect Theory for taxpayer compliance are many.
The basic message is that changes in the objective costs and benefits of
compliance may have erratic impact on taxpayers because of the editing and
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evaluation processes. For example, there is a discontinuity in the
decision weight function between certainty and small probabilities,
implying that there is a fuzzy point at which risk shifts from "no chance"
to "risky" and then is weighted more heavily than objectively warranted.
Once this point is reached, increases in probability have less impact than
one would expect. However, changes in high probabilities have much larger
impact on preferences than proportional changes in low probabilities.
Since the exact location of the discontinuity is unspecified, it is
difficult to base policy on its existence. If the probability of penalty
were doubled, and taxpayers were made aware of this, it might have no
impact if they believed the probability was very small anyway (twice
nothing is nothing), might have some impact but not twice the effect if
the probabilities were in the shallow part of the curve, might have
moderate impact if the probabilities were in the steep part of the curve,
and might have very large impact if the change shifts people from
certainty (of no risk) to uncertainty.
This situation is made more complex by the editing operation. The
same objective situation can be framed in many different ways. A person
who takes an illegal deduction may face a 1% chance of being fined in a
given year, but over a 37-year period the same person faces about a 50%
chance of at least one fine. Slovic et al (1978) found that reframing the
probability of a serious auto accident from per-trip to per-lifetime
increased favorability toward seatbelts and predictions of own use.
The editing operation also affects how probabilities are combined.
The 1% chance of a fine may reflect a 2% chance of an audit and a 50%
chance of a fine if audited. The evaluation of this two-stage probability
is not equivalent to the evaluation of the product (pl=1%). Tversky and
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Kahneman (1981) found that people tend to respond to the second stage
probability more strongly than the first stage., suggesting that it may be
possible to get more impact for the same policy by advertising a
highly-probable conditional probability rather than a low-probability
event. Or, the auditing sample itself could be reframed as an intensive
audit of randomly selected counties such that the probability of being
audited given that your county is selected is much higher. Similarly,
Slovic et al. (1976) found that subjects evaluate the probability of a
chain of events by the overall coherence of the chain and the highly
likely conditional events can compensate for the unlikely ones. This
leads to the paradoxical result that longer conditional chains may be
rated more likely than shorter (also Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b).
The proposition that outcomes are evaluated against a reference point,
coupled with the changes in the value functions as outcomes change from
gains to losses, has considerable power for explaining the impact of
contextual information on preferences. For example, doctors confronted
with a hypothetical epidemic that would kill 600 people if unchecked
prefer a program that will "save" 400 lives to a program that has a
one-third chance of saving no lives and a two-thirds chance of saving all
600 lives. However, they prefer a program with a one-third chance that
600 will die and a two-thirds chance that no one will die to a program
where 200 will die. The difference in the choices is that in the "saving"
lives version, the reference point is set as if the 600 had died and the
saving of 400 lives is a gain from that reference point, but in the second
version the reference point is set with no one dead yet and 200 deaths
represent a loss.
Someone who has paid $7000 in taxes and owes another $100 at the end
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of the year could frame his situation as a $100 loss, a $7100 loss, a $200
gain over last year when he owed $300 at the end of the year, a $500 gain
over last year when he paid $7600 in taxes, or almost any gain or loss if
he takes as a reference point what his neighbor or his coworker or "people
like him" are paying. Since people find losses very aversive, we might
expect that someone would strive harder to reduce a "loss" than to make an
equivalent "gain," even though the distinction may depend on a reference
point that seems arbitrary to us.
Loftus (1985) proposed that withholding has the effect of shifting the
reference point and, therefore, increases in withholding will decrease the
motivation to reduce the taxes owed at filing time (by legal or illegal
means). This seems reasonable if the reference point is indeed zero taxes
owed on April 15 and if the reference point on salaries and other withheld
income sources also shifts to the new reduced levels (which may not be
reduced but simply less increased from last year than otherwise). The
theoretical principles for how people bundle gains and losses are (Thaler,
1983): (1) a series of small gains is preferred to one large gain, (2) one
large loss is preferred to a series of small losses, (3) it is better to
offset a small loss against a larger gain, and (4) it is better to keep
separate a small gain and a larger loss. Although we know that people
will try very hard to reduce losses, we do not know how they frame changes
in tax requirements over time. Increased withholding on salaries or
dividends or tips could be perceived as a series of small losses. In such
a case, Prospect Theory proposes that it is better to bundle small losses
together into one large loss to reduce the impact (as we do in using
credit cards). However, increased withholding could be perceived as a
small loss bundled together with a larger gain (salary or salary
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increases), which would make it preferred to the end-of-year large loss.
Although Prospect Theory has considered the importance of the editing
phase and has studied several potent framing effects, there is as yet no
theory of how the editing processes work. In a general way, "frames" can
be thought of as viewpoints or metaphors that help structure
ill-structured problems, thus separating figure from ground, highlighting
some aspects of a situation and hiding others (Russo & Schoemaker, 1985).
For example, do taxpayers frame their tax behavior as "compliance" or
"avoidance" (Scholz, 1985)? If compliance, then the taxpayer may have
strategies for identifying legal obligations and fulfilling them. If
avoidance, then the taxpayer may have strategies for identifying loopholes
and scams. These seem to imply fundamentally different behaviors. As a
second example, Reaganomics seems to have framed taxes as an indication of
government waste, a loss to the individual taxpayer and to the society
(ie., less spending). They have increased the sense of unfairness and
failure to get value from tax money, as indexed by opinion polls about
attitudes toward taxes (ICF, 1985). On the other hand, it is possible to
frame taxes as a contribution and sharing. In this way, the "frame"
serves both to make salient certain benefits or costs of taxpaying and
establish a reference point of what government services are worth, what
"should" be paid, or what is "fair."
Prospect Theory, as well as the utility theories previously discussed,
requires people to judge the probabilities and outcomes attendant on
various alternatives. Utility theory considers probabilities and dollar
equivalents to be constituents or primitives of the decision process.
Even studies attempting to disprove utility theory typically supply
probabilities and dollar outcomes. They thus turn uncertain decisions
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into risky decisions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Lopes, 1983) and shortcut
the process of assessing probabilities and outcomes. This simplification
has been very useful for disproving the economic utility model since,
presumably, human performance would deteriorate even further in more
ambiguous and complex contexts. However, if our goal is to understand and
model actual decisions rather than to disprove the utility model, we must
recognize that such changes and simplifications in problems can have
serious impact on results (Hershey et al., 1982; Payne, 1982). Changes in
the way information is presented (e.g., graphs vs. numbers), the order of
presentation, the context or wording of questions, all have been shown to
affect decisions. In the next section we discuss the way people assess
probability and outcomes using judgmental heuristics.
Judgmental Heuristics
Judgments of probability have in some ways had a parallel history to
the study of decision making. In the beginning were formal mathematical
models, in this case Bayes' Theorem for updating probabilities (Edwards,
1954) and the entire probability calculus. Evidence began accumulating
that people did not follow Bayes' Theorem (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971).
A major breakthrough occurred in a series of papers by Kahneman and
Tversky in the early 1970s, summarized in Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
They suggested that people have fundamentally different understanding of
probability than the accepted mathematical models.
Research shows the dominance of the particular, the personal, and the
comparative over the general, the impersonal, and the absolute. For
example, in judging the likelihood of being penalized for cheating on
taxes, most people would not consider statistical information about the
number of people penalized in a given year to be as compelling as specific
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instances (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), especially
events that happened to the self or a known other (Tyler, 1980).
Likelihood would be evaluated by recalling or imagining (and sometimes
seeking out) instances of the event. The ease with which such instances
can be brought to mind, known as availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),
determines the subjective sense of likelihood or confidence in future
occurrence. Although the availability heuristic is often useful for
estimating likelihood, and usually gives good results, it tends to favor
events that are easily imaginable or recallable. For example, a recent
well-publicized plane crash creates widespread concern for airline safety,
which gradually abates as the salience of the event decreases over time.
Similarly, a well-publicized conviction for tax fraud should make the
likelihood of punishment temporarily increase, and the same event can be
made more salient with pictures, and connections to taxpayers such as the
same city or other similarities; the IRS seems to save some juicy examples
for late March to create this effect on taxpayers.
However, not all information that is available is considered relevant
or even used in an expected way. The representativeness heuristic
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) describes a process by which information is
matched up for similarity with proposed hypotheses or understandings of
the causes of events. Thus, one coworker who relates how she never
reports tips and has never been audited could outweigh a news story about
IRS prosecutions of major tax cheats or a news story about stepped-up
auditing activities. The reason is that the coworker is highly-similar
and the one case is considered very compelling in comparison to stories
about people whose lives and noncompliance activities are different from
our own, or abstract information about probability in general. In fact,
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stories of the prosecution of major tax cheats may have paradoxical
effects similar to the "gambler's fallacy" -- the small tax cheat feels
safer knowing the IRS is busy with other types of problems. Many items of
information could be viewed as indications of danger from some
perspectives and safety from others. Kunreuther (1976) found that many
people in flood-prone areas dropped their flood insurance after a flood,
apparently from the belief that since a nonce-in-ten-years" flood had just
happened, they were now "safe". If the person believes that auditing
resources are fixed (like the supply of floods), then every revealed case
decreases his personal risk. If the person is assessing auditing
probabilities, then every revealed case increases his personal risk!
Thus, people are seeking an underlying structure to information, but
it is a structure of commonsensical meaning and causality rather than the
acausal categorization of events in formal probability theory. This
distinction is most clearly seen in the difference between causal and
diagnostic information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980, 1982a). Although they
are equally informative in a statistical sense, people reason with causal
information far more readily than with diagnostic information. For
example, they understand that a tall father is very likely to have a tall
son, but are less willing to predict that a tall son is likely to have a
tall father. Statistical information that fits a causal hypothesis is
readily used: a particular automobile accident is more likely to involve a
Green cab than a Blue cab because Green cabs have a higher accident rate
(interpretable as Green cabs having worse drivers). But statistical
information that is equally informative yet lacks a causal interpretation
is not used: the same accident is not judged more likely to involve a
Green cab simply because Green cabs are more numerous.
-24-
III
The fact that information is interpreted in terms of prior
understandings is well exemplified by the tendency to confirm or support
hypotheses. People tend to selectively attend, recall, and interpret
information in such a way as to support their own views. For example,
Lord et al. (1979) found that people given one research study that
supported their views on capital punishment and one that supported the
opposite position became even more convinced of their own position and
interpreted the contrary study as being methodologically weak. If one
gives credence to supporting evidence and disparages opposing evidence, it
is always possible to become more convinced of one's own correctness.
Thus, people not only rationalize the morality of their own conduct (Sykes
and Matza, 1967), but also rationalize the evidence about likely
consequences and even about past consequences (dissonance reduction,
Festinger, 1957). A classic example in the domain of public risk is that
the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident convinced anti-nuclear
people that reactors were a terrible danger because so many unanticipated
events could trigger a near-disaster; yet pro-nuclear people were
convinced by the same event that reactors were safe because the safety
systems really did work under a severe test (Slovic et al, 1980). This is
not to imply that people cannot learn or revise their opinion, but only to
say that people do not give up their supposed knowledge easily.
One of the most powerful and pervasive psychological tendencies is to
reason comparatively rather than absolutely. Prospect Theory draws upon
this tendency, and so does the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This
heuristic suggests that we estimate unknown quantities, whether likelihood
or outcome, by adopting an anchor and using our knowledge about the
current situation to adjust the anchor. Unfortunately, we find that the
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revision process is usually incomplete and the adjustment is not
sufficient -- estimates remain too close to the anchor. The fact that
confidence limits are usually too narrow is explicable as the provision of
an estimate range by adjustment from the best guess (Lichtenstein et al.,
1982). The phenomenon that choices among gambles may be inconsistent with
bids can be interpreted as anchoring and adjustment. Specifically, choice
is based on overall evaluation and comparison of the gambles, but bids
apparently create an anchor on the possible monetary winnings, which are
then adjusted or discounted (insufficiently) for likelihood and risk
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973).
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) proposed that the assessment of frequency
evidence to estimate a probability is based on a combination of anchoring
and adjustment and imagination or availability. They suggest that
estimates of probability are anchored on the proportion of evidence and
arguments supporting a hypothesis, and then adjusted for the amount of
evidence, alternative hypotheses and evidence that can be imagined. On
the basis of a few simple assumptions, their evidence model predicts a
relationship between strength of evidence and probability that, under
certain conditions, is very similar to Prospect Theory's decision weight
function. Their theory implies that attitudes toward uncertainty (or
ambiguity in their terminology), in addition to risk attitudes, affect
preferences. For example, hypothetical businessmen were more likely to
insure against a low-probability loss when there was uncertainty about the
probability of loss, but less likely to insure against a high-probability
loss when there was uncertainty (Study 4). Thus, preferences among
alternatives depended on risk and uncertainty in complex ways. In the
context of tax compliance, an illegal deduction with a low
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probability of detection would be increasingly avoided if there was less
certainty about the likelihood of detection, perhaps counteracting the
risk-seeking tendencies in Prospect Theory. However, a deduction with a
higher probability of detection might be more sought after under
uncertainty, thus augmenting risk-seeking. Without research directed at
the specific parameters of the Einhorn and Hogarth model, such predictions
can only by stated as if...then hypotheses.
Anchoring and adjustment principles can also be seen in decision
making on the larger scale. Lindblom's (1959) statement of
"incrementalism" and March and Simon's (1958) "problemistic search" both
refer to the tendency to base decisions on past decisions with small
revisions. Budget decisions are typically based on past budgets; Jimmy
Carter's attempt to introduce "zero-based" budgeting points out the
enormous effort involved in starting from scratch. Presumably, taxpayers
follow routines and use as a model their last-year's tax forms or a
friend's tax forms in order to avoid starting from scratch. The problem,
of course, is that change is slow and.responses to changes in the tax laws
or one's personal situation may be absent or insufficient (cf. Scholz,
1985).
Comments on Utility Models
Utility models have taken us a long way toward understanding decision
processes because they are simple, broadly applicable,
mathematically-tractable, and sensible for theory and application. They
also fit human behavior and market behavior in useful ways. However,
several decades of research demonstrate that utility models are wrong in
almost every detail. Even Nobel-Prize Economists are willing to speak out
against the model (Arrow, 1982). Research and theory has benefitted by
having a benchmark or comparison (or straw man), and new models drawing on
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the structure of utility theory but incorporating psychological principles
are revolutionizing the field because they combine the scope and power of
utility models with stronger empirical support (e.g., Prospect Theory).
Considerable progress is also being made by assuming that deviations from
utility models represent ways to optimize decision quality and decision
costs, a meta-utility (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, 1982; Johnson &
Payne, in press).
However, there is a compelling alternative approach to the study of
decision making that avoids starting from utility models. Essentially,
the utility models postulate simple algebraic rules for evaluating or
selecting alternatives given certain classes of information. They are
basically input-output models that use utility models to predict whatever
goes on in the "black box" of the human mind, and thus define away the
necessity of studying mediating mental processes. The alternative is to
put aside the axioms and optimizing rules, and ask the more inductive
psychological question, "How do people make decisions?" Considerable
progress has been made addressing this question from a cognitive approach,
and it is to this theory and research that we now turn.
THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING
The cognitive approach considers the human mind as an information
processing system. Interest centers on those mechanisms and processes by
which the mind takes in information, transforms it, and constructs a
response. In contrast to behaviorists who traditionally sought to
interrelate responses directly to stimuli, and preferred to summarize the
entire mental apparatus in terms of "prior learning history," the
-28-
III
cognitivists hypothesize a detailed set of mental mechanisms that, in
principle, could reference detectable physiological events-and structures.
.The make-up of the human mind is typically conceived as a set of
sensory transducers that produce an initial input, an attention mechanism
that serves as a gateway to further processing, a series of memories that
store sensory input and transformed inputs for greater and lesser periods
of time, and a central processing unit or working memory that operates on
information. Many cognitive psychologists use the metaphor of the
computer as a way to understand the mind and computer programs as a way to
express theories of mental processes.
Limited Rationality
The fundamental principle underlying this analysis of the mind is the
concept of limited rationality, or physical limits on the various
processes that comprise thinking (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972). Thus,
attention, memory, computational capacity, and so forth are all limited.
In order to function in a complex world, people must create simplified
views of that world, and simple strategies for responding to our
approximations or educated guesses. This is usually quite adequate, but
can be shown in particular circumstances to be a very poor representation
of reality.
Information processing researchers sometimes adopt the same strategy
as those following the "psychophysical paradigm" (Phillips, 1983) by
assuming a correct answer and examining deviations from correctness.
However, the goal is not a cataloguing of errors and biases but an
identification of situations in which useful descriptive information can
be found. Discrepancies suggest the presence of intuitive strategies and
other limited processes. Descriptive models can then be developed that
-29-
mimic the way people behave. In this way, researchers can identify
fundamental and generalizable processes at an intensive level of detail.
[Suggestions can even be made for improving performance in real-world
situations. However, the transition from demonstrations of errors and
biases to real-world applications is tenuous because additional mechanisms
may exist in natural settings (e.g., learning, Hogarth, 1981;
organizations, Cyert & March, 1963)].
Process-Level Descriptions
The hallmark of the cognitive approach is the attempt to describe in
detail the characteristics of mental apparatus (e.g., the size of
short-term memory) and the step-by-step processes by which tasks are
performed. At the extreme, highly stylized laboratory tasks allow the
study of elementary information processes (Posner and McCleod, 1982). For
example, the task of scanning a list to find a particular character would
enable the testing of models of attention, memory, and similarity
judgments. More complex but well-structured tasks such as mental
arithmetic and chess have sucessfully been analyzed into component acts
(Simon, 1978). Detailed comparisons of human behavior with computer
programs have allowed the development of basic knowledge about attention,
memory, and problem-solving strategies.
The same goals and style are evident in the cognitive approach to more
complex but ill-structured tasks (Simon, 1973). These tasks are
characterized by having no obvious way to break up and process the
elements of the task. Instead, each person essentially recreates their
own version of the task and solves it in their own way. General
principles can be adduced, and theories can be built in considerable
detail, but behavior cannot be reduced to the atomic level of elementary
information processes.
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In the past decade, the cognitive approach has become a major
conceptual and methodological viewpoint in fields that are considerably
less structured and bounded than the original domain of research.
Cognitive approaches to social psychology, medicine, criminal justice, and
so forth seem to offer rigor and precision for these fuzzier domains. The
themes characterizing this approach include the selection or construction
of bounded tasks with apparent cognitive content, careful research designs
or controls on the tasks, observations intended to suggest process-level
detail, and step-by-step mechanistic models.
The methods of the cognitive approach generally involve individuals
engaged in a definable task, an extension of the laboratory origins of the
field. The desired level of theoretical detail requires observations
capable of revealing such detail. There are two basic strategies to make
observations extremely informative: 1) to structure the task so carefully
that performance implies specific mechanisms, and 2) to look for products
and indicators of the separate processes under observation.
The cognitive approach has mostly been limited to brief repetitious
tasks requiring an answer, and subjects who are presumed to want to get
the right answer. It has mostly ignored how people acquire the knowledge,
skills, and motives they bring to the tasks, long-term effects of
behavior, or social conventions and relationships. It has only begun to
think about how the tasks chosen for study relate to the more complex and
interwoven tasks in the "real world." In short, the approach presumes
basic inherent processes of the human mind with interchangeable
domain-specific content from a particular task. Accordingly, it should be
evident that I am presenting the cognitive approach not as "the answer" to
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the study of decision making, but as a valuable and insightful line of
theory and research that also has its limitations.
Decision Heuristics
Schwab et al (1979) conclude their review of studies of
expectancy-value models with the comment that, "there is a nagging
suspicion that expectancy theory overintellectualizes the cognitive
processes people go through when choosing alternative actions" (p. 146).
Highly simplified decision rules, such as satisficing (choose the first
alternative that is good enough), habit, or modelling of others' behavior
seem to be more frequent than the systematic intellectual activity assumed
in utility theories. In this section, we will review studies emerging
from the cognitive approach that seek to identify decision making
behaviors rather than presume or test the utility model.
Behavioral research has proposed or discovered a variety of decision
rules or heuristics. The guiding assumption is that people have a
repertoire (Kelley, 1973; Payne, 1976) of such procedures, some of them
widely shared, some more specific to individuals or to particular tasks.
A currently active area of research and theorizing is to study the
conditions under which different decision strategies are used (Payne,
1982). Some of this research suggests that strategy choice is itself a
utility-maximizing choice balancing effort and other decision costs
against the quality of the decision outcomes (ie., decision strategies
differ in their likelihood of selecting the best alternative) (Beach and
Mitchell, 1978). Other research seems to suggest that people learn
through trial and error or select through a less sophisticated process a
strategy that is easy enough and good enough in the particular situation
(Payne, 1982; Johnson and Payne, in press).
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Rather than enumerate the variety of decision rules uncovered to date
(see, e.g., Svenson, 1979), it seems more reasonable to discuss the
dimensions on which these rules vary. First, some rules are organized
around alternatives while others are organized around attributes. For
example, utility-like models process the information about each
alternative and produce a score for that alternative; the highest-scoring
alternative is then chosen. In a contrasting example, the
Elimination-By-Aspects rule (Tversky, 1969) sorts all alternatives on the
most important attribute or dimension, and holds for further consideration
only those alternatives scoring highest. Ties are broken by considering
the next most important attribute, until only the best alternative (or
alternatives if more than one are to be chosen) is left. A particular
alternative never gets a summary "score" that can be generalized beyond
the choice set. The addition of a new alternative affects the ordering in
ways that depend on the particular alternatives in the choice set.
Second, some decision strategies are compensatory, in that unfavorable
information can be counteracted by other highly favorable information, but
other strategies are noncompensatory. Utility models and additive
policy-capturing models allow attributes to compensate or average. A low
probability of being penalized for cheating on taxes could be compensated
by a huge penalty for the few people that are caught (cf. Blumstein,
1983). In contrast, a satisficing or conjuctive rule requires that
certain key attributes be above criteria or threshholds. Any attribute
that falls below criterion cannot be compensated by other attributes that
are highly favorable. For example, those taxpayers with a strong code of
honesty might not "trade-off" honesty against monetary gain: it is enough
to know that tax cheating is dishonest.
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Third, strategies differ in the extent to which they are task specific
or generalizable. Payne (1973) describes the task of choosing among risky
gambles as a contingent process model in which the gambles are first
classified as "good- or "bad" gambles based on the probability of winning
compared to the probability of losing, and then the amount to win and lose
are processed comparatively in different ways depending on the initial
classification. It seems likely that people have an endless capacity to
create task structures and task-specific decision procedures (Humphreys
and Berkeley, 1983; Phillips, 1983) -- to instantiate decision strategies
in new ways, to combine familiar routines, and to create new procedures.
It is therefore not surprising that individual differences in decision
strategies are quite substantial, and that strategies change in response
to "seemingly minor changes in tasks" (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981, p. 61).
Research investigating these decision procedures has uncovered-
characteristics of tasks that shift decision makers from strategy to
strategy. When faced with more alternatives, decision makers tend to use
noncompensatory strategies that quickly reduce the magnitude of the task
(Payne, 1976; Payne and Braunstein, 1978). Phased decision rules seem
quite common, in which multiple alternatives are screened by a
noncompensatory rule until only two or three are left, which are then
compared by a more effortful but more powerful compensatory strategy.
Other features of the decision task such as number of attributes, time
pressure, response mode, information display format are reviewed in Payne
(1982).
However, substantial individual differences in strategy use have been
found. Weaver and Carroll (in press) studied the decision making of
expert and novice shoplifters as they walked through retail stores.
Novices seem to be deterred by any undesirable attribute, a conjunctive
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rule, whereas experts balanced deterrents with facilitators or discounted the
deterrents in the face of additional information, a compensatory rule.
Experts seem to develop appropriate task-specific rules (Johnson, in press;
many others) but may have difficulty stepping up a level to consider the
usefulness of their rules, as in studies of creativity that show a failure to
innovate by those too experienced in a domain (Hogarth, 1980).
It is important to realize that the cognitive approach has revealed these
decision strategies not simply by measuring output judgments as a function of
input task attributes and situations, but also by developing new methods for
observing the hypothesized mental processes comprising these strategies
(Carroll, 1980; Payne et al, 1978; Svenson, 1979). Process-tracing
techniques such as the monitoring of information search, collection of verbal
protocols, and measurement of response time offer new insight into mental
mechanisms. For example, the difference between strategies organized by
alternative and strategies organized by attribute can be physically revealed
in information search studies where decision makers scan information in
dramatically different ways depending on which strategy they are using.
Verbal protocols, statements made during the task, and output judgments as a
function of input conditions reinforce the information search data to make a
strong case for the process by which people decide.
Hierarchical Decision Making
The fact that there are multiple ways to come to a decision suggests a
hierarchical process: a strategy must be "chosen," which then "chooses- the
alternative to be enacted. This could create an infinite regress: how do we
choose a strategy to choose a strategy to... Humphreys and Berkeley (1983)
and Jaques (1976, 1978) suggest several levels of decision problem
representations, each setting the conditions under which the next level
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operates. Expertise, abstract analytical ability, cognitive complexity,
cognitive style (e.g., Kilmann & Mitroff, 1976) and other traits and
experiences could be considered to reference both the extensiveness of
options at any level, and the number of levels that can be deliberately
traversed (ie. a "high level" person can deliberately question a fundamental
assumption that alters the strategies for selecting decision procedures).
Such a hierarchical structure, in which prior decisions or acceptance of
procedures or premises serve to structure further decisionmaking, has the
advantage of efficiency in that the full range of issues need not be
confronted at once, but this very partitioning of decisions reduces the
resultant decision quality, because higher-level structures tend not to
change (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959). The
concept of a "frame" in Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) similarly
expresses the simplification of a problem by the selection (consciously or
unconsciously) of a particular set of definitions and viewpoints. Our
discussion of criminal behavior suggests that the decision to be a criminal
precedes or sets the boundaries around decisions to commit specific crimes.
In discussing decision strategies, we can talk about choosing not to decide
(Corbin, 1980), deciding to experiment in order to learn how to decide
(Einhorn, 1980; Hogarth, 1981), and so forth, which reflect this movement
across levels. In organizations, standard operating procedures (March &
Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963) have the effect of efficiently handling
common situations with the attendant cost of not recognizing or responding
well to new situations.
Applying these ideas to income tax compliance requires that we consider
compliance to involve a series of decisions and a set of strategies that may
differ among taxpayers and across situations. The simple act of basing your
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tax return on your neighbor's could reflect either low-level or high-level
processing. It would be very low-level if the person copies the various
elements of the neighbor's tax return, substituting only where amounts
differ. It would be somewhat higher-level if the taxpayer imitates the
neighbor's rules and procedures rather than his products. It could be even
higher-level if the taxpayer imbeds the imitation routine in another routine,
such as "follow his rules on those parts of the form that are similar to mine
and follow other rules on different parts of the form, or under different
circumstances."
Operating at a high level implies laying out a tax plan, including
recording and reporting information, setting withholding, finding tax relief
opportunities, remaining aware of changes in the tax laws, and so forth.
Once the planning is accomplished, tax behavior consists mostly of following
the plan, e.g., putting records safely away, opening an IRA, and so forth.
Later behaviors, such as computing deductions, are constrained by all the
earlier tax-relevant behavior. Of course, a tax plan, no matter how
detailed, does not guarantee the diligence necessary to follow it (Scholz,
1985). Once the habit of not recording business expenses emerges, very
different routines have to be engineered to create the tax reporting figures
out of a "shoebox" of receipts (or, worse yet, no shoebox of receipts).
Operating at a low level implies very little planfulness, or following
the same plan every year, and a mad scurrying near April 15 to assemble and
interpret tax materials. For simple situations this may be sufficient, but
for others it may mean carrying scraps of paper to a tax preparer to be
magically turned into a return, or estimating various figures to reach a
"reasonable" or "fair" result.
Taxpayers undoubtedly differ in how "top-down" or rationalistic, planful,
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and proactive their tax compliance decisions are. They may switch back and
forth between self-aware and deliberate decision making and the habitual,
unthoughtful carrying out of procedures set down earlier in the process. For
most people, "popping up" a level and considering premises as problematic is
unusual. Most taxpayers simply hire a third-party preparer to operate for
them at higher levels; I wonder how the client conceptualizes the acts of the
preparer.
The above analysis presumes that at the highest level the taxpayer has
established a frame or problem statement of "How do I pay my taxes?" or "How
do I comply with the tax laws?" However, it is possible to reframe the
entire problem as "How can I pay the least taxes"? or "Where can I cheat?" or
even as "How can I pay my fair share?" These questions involve motivation or
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), referring to the relationship between
citizen and government as one based on fear, personal gain, norms,
rationality, or morality (Kinsey, 1985; Vogel, 1974). We could view this as
a problem of conformity (Cialdini, 1986) or organizational socialization (Van
Maanen & Schein, 1979).
Surveys of taxpayers reveal several attitudinal types that could be
interpreted in terms of a basic motive or frame: (1) Honest Taxpayers, (2)
Utility Maximizers, (3) Beaten Taxpayers, (4) Equity Seekers, and (5) Need
Mobilized (freely translated from terms used by Yankelovich et al, 1984). It
is interesting to consider what might generate a transition from one type to
another (cf. Scholz, 1985). For example, how many examples of unfairness and
frustrating interactions with tax forms are necessary to turn Honest
Taxpayers into Equity Seekers? How much need will mobilize a Beaten
Taxpayer? How much rational debate on taxpaying does it take to turn
everyone into Utility Maximizers?
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Even when the taxpayer frames the problem as cheating rather than
compliance, this cheating can also be done in a planful, high-level way, or a
reactive, low-level way. An auto mechanic could have made a "standing
decision" to look for ways to avoid paying taxes owed. Reasons for making
such a decision could include personal need, a sense of frustration with his
economic progress, a sense of inequity when considering rich people or
publicity about rich people who pay very little taxes, the pronouncements of
the government decrying waste of (his) tax money, contact with friends or
other mechanics who regularly cheat, a desire to get whatever he can, a need
to feel superior, and so forth. Given such a decision to avoid paying taxes
where possible, the more planful, top-down strategies call for assessing
overall amounts or percentages to hide, types of transactions to avoid
recording, and other goals and rules. A less planful mode is simply to look
out for good opportunities, such as customers who pay in cash and have
frequent transactions so they are known to be "safe" and are unlikely to be
keeping track (cf. Kagan, 1985). This "now-and-then" behavior may be guided
by elaborate rules or by something closer to "impulse buying" -- the occasion
arises, the thought of cheating occurs, and the situation passes a few simple
criteria of risk. An even less planful mode is to come to the end of the
year with a few shoeboxes full of records and some bills to pay. Several
"trial balances" may be attempted and a strategy constructed at that time for
balancing safety and need, or for meeting a target tax amount.
The factors that produce a decision to be open to noncompliance may
therefore differ from the factors that effect a particular decision to cheat
or a particular tactical choice. Even if we consider tax behavior to occur
only during tax season, then the decision to cheat could be made once and
later actions predicated on a currently-unquestioned prior premise that the
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person is "open" to such opportunities.
I envision the context of taxpaying to be similar to the "garbage can"
model (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972) in that there are taxpayers looking for
relief, IRS publications providing information, third-party preparers
offering advice, tax shelters and other "solutions" looking for "problems"
they can solve, media reporting of a broad variety of tax-relevant
information, tax consultants trying to design new strategies, and many
different kinds of taxpayers circulating in the "garbage can" affecting one
another in various ways. Although the "garbage can" may seem like just a
visual metaphor, it has been found useful in analyzing organizational
decisions (March and Olsen, 1976) and presents a description of preferences
as emerging from a discovery process that includes acting and experiencing
outcomes (March, 1978; Weick, 1977). My personal garbage can of mail in the
past few months includes a solicitation to buy a book called How to Beat the
IRS (secrets of a former IRS agent), the opportunity to subscribe to the Tax
Avoidance Digest and get the free gifts such as "Tax Secrets Worth a Fortune"
and "27 Major Loopholes in the Tax Laws," and a request for a contribution to
the National Taxpayers Union promising to fight for changes in the federal
pension plan supported by our taxes!
The concept of hierarchical strategies suggests that change occurs at the
lower levels more readily than at higher levels, and that change typically
involves modifications or additions to existing behavior rather than major
shifts. Change occurs because of the continual press of events and
opportunities in the "garbage can" but the taxpayer has to be prepared to
change and capable of exercising the new behaviors. The stimuli to change
are manifold: changes in the tax laws that force changes in tax strategies,
acute financial need that makes the year-end "bottom line" unacceptable, the
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financial gymnastics of a tax preparer, accidents and errors that bring no
negative consequences, friends' revelations of their own tax strategies and
outcomes, repeated media disclosure of legal and illegal tax avoidance
tactics, growing feelins of inequity, frustration with tax forms, or simply
the propensity to explore when some slack is available. It seems clear that
we have created a societal climate that prevents stability for many
taxpayers. Frequent changes in the tax laws, the economic incentives to
innovators who create legal tax avoidance strategies, the publicity given to
corporations and the wealthy who strive to reduce their taxes, the public
debate over the fairness and effectiveness of taxes, negative feelings toward
government encouraged by the Reagan administration, the societal emphasis on
personal well-being and deemphasis of communal motives, and so forth, all
,push in the direction of thinking about taxpaying more, making the taxpaying
process more costly and frustrating, and defining one's behavior as "tax
avoidance."
Competence of Taxpayers
Any analysis of taxpayer compliance and noncompliance would have to
consider decisions as the confluence of three factors: opportunity, skills,
and motivation. Opportunity and skill combine in two ways. First,
deliberate tax cheating occurs when skill is sufficiently high to take
advantage of opportunities to cheat. The taxpayer has to become aware of an
opportunity and then select or develop a strategy to use the opportunity.
Naturally, such actions require a certain motivation to carry out these
behaviors in the face of costs such as time, effort, and anxiety over risks.
Second, accidental tax cheating occurs when skill is sufficiently Qlow that
errors are made.
The IRS analysis of audit research presumes that noncompliance has two
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components: tax cheating that produces undercompliance, and errors that
result in random under- and overcompliance. Thus, results showing 38% of
taxpayers with underpayment errors and 8% with overpayment errors is
interpreted as 30% net undercompliance (ie., 30% cheat, and 16% make errors
that cancel out) (IRS, 1983; Kinsey, 1984). However, errors are likely to be
omissions, and omissions of income that produce undercompliance are likely to
far outweigh omissions of deductions that produce overcompliance. Intensive
IRS audits find that 17% of taxpayers fail to list income sources of $50 or
less (Kinsey, 1984).
Opportunity, skills, and motivation are all influenced by the complexity
of the behaviors required to comply with the tax codes. For example, the
Form 1040 instructions are written at an average 10th grade readability,
beyond the capabilities of at least 25% of adults (Comptroller General,
1978). I recently attempted to complete a Series 5500 form for Keogh
Accounts that was new for 1984. I was unable to figure it out without help
from an accountant, and further discovered an error in the form that would
have produced a nonsensical final result had I followed the instructions word
for word.
Such complexity has a direct effect on accidental tax cheating, by making
the forms too difficult to fill out accurately. It also makes tax compliance
a social situation, by forcing large numbers of taxpayers to seek some sort
of assistance from the IRS, family and friends, or tax preparers. Further,
it creates more opportunities for tax cheating because there are so many
different "niches" and so many gray areas where the laws are vague or the
only accessible traces of transactions are by personal report. More of these
"niches" are available to more skilled taxpayers or those who have access to
such skills through knowledgeable friends or paid tax advisors.
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Further, and possibly most important, the complexity of tax forms has
major motivational impact. First, it creates frustration and thereby
generates efforts to get around the requirements or get back at the IRS.
Second, it creates feelings of inequity as those experiencing more difficulty
realize that others can pay for arcane expertise and profit from the
complexity. Third, it offers a challenge to some taxpayers who would like. to
beat the system. Finally, the complexity changes the perceived risks
associated with noncompliance. Taxpayers may believe the system is so
cumbersome that they are less likely to be caught, or recognize that it is so
complex that everyone will be making errors. Long (1981) emphasizes that "it
is difficult to speak of a 'correct' return" and that an instructor at an IRS
school for training revenue agents told her that "agents could find 'errors'
in 99.9 percent of all tax returns, if they wanted to" (p. 205). But, this
complexity blurs the line between legitimate (albeit aggressive) tax
avoidance and tax evasion, making the IRS hesistate to label anyone as a
deliberate tax cheat and apply heavy penalties. Presumably, many tax evaders
realize that they can claim to have made an error or to have been confused,
and merely have to pay the taxes they would have paid in any case.
Steps to simplify tax forms and tax requirements would thus have many
benefits. More people could do their own returns and feel better about the
process. The sense of equity would be enhanced. The opportunities for
cheating would be reduced, particularly those available to the more wealthy.
The risks associated with noncompliance might be seen more clearly and
administered more closely. The costs of administering the tax code would
greatly decrease. However, there are constitutencies that benefit from
complexity (the IRS, Long, 1981; and paid tax preparers) and reasons to
believe that complexity increases uncertainty and therefore reduces
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noncompliance (Popkin, 1985; at least sometimes, Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985).
The simplification and clarification of tax forms requires an
understanding of how people think about and process their taxes. It is more
than just a question of reading level. Instructions should follow the
natural categories and the temporal and hierarchical organization of
taxpayers' behavior. There may need to be several forms for different levels
of sophistication.
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The history of deterrence efforts is not highly encouraging. Many
apparently successful deterrence strategies had only temporary effects.
People adapt; they revise probabilities back down with experience, reframe
for themselves, adopt new avoidance strategies, and so forth. This is the
history of attempts to deter shoplifting (Bickman et al, 1979), drunk drivers
(Ross, 1982), and family violence (Tanchen & Witte, 1985). Before
large-scale changes or influence attempts are recommended, we need a better
model of taxpayer behavior that can predict long-term as well as short-term
effects and that is general enough to be informative across changes in the
tax laws.
The current research efforts using intensive audits and public opinion
polls are helpful but incomplete. Besides the possibility of bias, these
strategies have not provided much detail about taxpaying behavior. I believe
issues of "How much?" have dominated over issues of "What?" and "How?" and
"Why?" We need a much better understanding of the many varieties of
taxpaying behavior. Once we understand how competence, motivation, and
opportunities play out over time into strategies and changes in behavior, we
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would be better able to deal with issues of prevalence and the effectiveness
of possible interventions. I have organized the discussion'df research
directions around methods: surveys, tests, process-tracing, longitudinal
studies, and field quasiexperiments.
Surveys
Survey research and focus groups, the sort of research that has already
been done (ICF, 1985; Yankelovich et al., 1984), can reveal considerable
information about taxpayer behavior and strategies if the right questions are
asked. Questions about noncompliance have generally lumped together many
kinds of noncompliance. Questions have not been addresses at overall
strategies or what generates reevaluation of strategies. Careful and
intensive survey work should be done focused on the following questions:
1. What series of events occurs during the year relevant to taxes?
2. What strategies do you use to collect information, keep records,
report information, reduce your taxes, and prepare to pay your
taxes?
3. When is the last time you changed the way you report, pay, or compute
your taxes? What did you change and why?
4. Can you think of other ways to do your taxes? Can you think of ways
to avoid paying taxes, including ways that are illegal and sure to
get you in trouble? For each of these tax avoiding strategies,
explain how you heard of it or thought it up, how much you think you
could save, what the risks are and how likely they are, and why you
aren't doing them.
5. What are you doing now to reduce your taxes? Continue as in Q. 4.
6. Suppose I could guarantee you that you would not be audited next year
no matter what you put on your tax forms. What would you do
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differently?
7. This year the IRS is going to audit some income tax forms on a random
basis. However, in exchange for agreeing to be audited, you can
have a $50 tax rebate. Would you be willing to do this? What is
the smallest rebate you would accept in exchange for being audited?
Suppose your return was to be placed in a pool with a 50% chance of
being audited. What is the smallest rebate you would accept in
exchange for being placed in that pool?
8. What exactly happens when you are audited? What is the worst thing
that could happen, and the best? How would your family, friends,
and employers feel if they knew you were audited? How would they
feel if they knew you had to pay a penalty for failure to report all
your income?
The first use of such surveys should be to identify concepts and issues
such as types of strategies and types of taxpayers. It would be entirely
appropriate to focus attention on groups that are considered "high risk" such
as part-time contractors, owners of cash businesses, and so forth (Witte,
1985). However, given the danger that previous methods may not have revealed
all the market niches for noncompliance, it may be desirable at an early
stage to do some sampling for heterogeneity. The second use of surveys is to
identify the prevalence (and therefore the impact and potential savings) of
various tax strategies, noncompliance activities, and taxpayer types. This
is a critical policy step but should not be pushed ahead of our understanding
of taxpaying itself.
Competency Test
A second mode of data collection would be a tax competency test, aimed
not at motivation but at ability. Some of the above questions address what
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people know about tax strategies. The tax competency test would begin with
some factual questions-about the law, what taxes are used for, the penalties
for noncompliance, and the likelihood of these penalties. A second part
would ask respondents to interpret tax instructions and fill out a sample
form given input information. The third part would be most important. Given
a complex set of information about a hypothetical person including income
sources and expenses and record availability, they would be asked to fill out
tax forms for that person and to design a tax strategy for them.
Instructions could vary in terms of avoiding an audit, paying the minimum
taxes, showing available cash at tax time to be very small or very large, and
so forth. The complex cases should be designed around known problem areas
such as people with a lot of cash income.
Such a test could be administered to samples of taxpayers of various
types, and to tax preparers. Although people are unlikely to admit that they
use illegal or questionable tax strategies, the purpose of this test is to
distinguish two issues: what people believe they should do in the sense of
preparing a tax return in the manner desired by the IRS (and their competency
to know what to do and carry it out), and what people know how to do but are
afraid to imply as their own practice. In order to elicit the latter
knowledge, the test has to be presented under some conditions as a challenge
and hypothetical instance (e.g., what would an unscrupulous tax preparer do?)
with no implications for their own tax behavior.
Process-Tracing
The aim of the process-tracing approach is to focus as closely as
possible on cognitive processes involved in tax behavior. Although survey
research can also address these questions, it is thought that people have
limited ability to report retrospectively on their cognitive processes.
Process-tracing methods are designed to supplement self-reports by getting
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"closer" to the mental events. Process-tracing studies would be a
labor-intensive but detailed way to identify taxpaying behaviors. This
hopefully would give better information about issues such as the following:
1. What is the temporal patterning of tax-relevant behaviors and
decisions among various types of taxpayers?
2. Why do people decide to cheat on their taxes? When does this occur?
3. What causes people to "pop up" a level and consider their standing
decision to be honest or to cheat? How frequent or rare is this?
4. What sort of strategies and plans do people use? What distinguishes
more planful people from more impulsive decision makers?
5. What causes people to shift from more planful to more impulsive
strategies or the reverse?
6. What are the sources of innovation in taxpaying and tax avoiding
strategies? What circumstances produce innovation, and at what
level does it tend to occur? What sort of people tend to be "lead
users" and how are these innovations transmitted?
One good possibility is to collect verbal protocols from taxpayers. This
would involve asking taxpayers to do their tax work under the watchful eye of
a researcher, and to "think aloud" while doing their taxes (Payne et al,
1978). If sufficient cooperation could be obtained (money and guarantees of
anonymity), the study could involve their own tax returns. Ideally, it would
include not only the few hours when they fill out the forms, but also other
times during the year when substantial tax planning or tax work occurs. This
would require either training to self-administer the protocol procedure
(perhaps backed up by taperecorded instructions), or the continual
availability of a researcher to show up on short notice and observe some
taxpaying activities, or agreements with the taxpayer to structure such
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activities within negotiated time periods. Otherwise, the task could be
hypothetical but realistic, and completed during one or more scheduled
sessions.
The key to this research is the ability to get people to reveal
noncompliance as well as compliance. Researchers would have to be adept at
achieving rapport and some iron-clad guarantees would have to be worked out
(immunity from audit?). Survey researchers have successfully elicited
reports of tax cheating and other illegal behaviors (although presumably
there is underreporting). Weaver and Carroll (in press) used verbal
protocols with self-reported experienced shoplifters during shopping trips in
retail stores, but their "experts" were really talented amateurs rather than
criminals who make a living by theft. However, even a process-tracing study
of good law-abiding taxpayers would be useful for better structuring our
understanding of tax compliance decisions. Instructional sets could be
overlaid to promote or inhibit noncompliance (Weaver and Carroll, in press).
A second useful process-tracing approach would be the monitoring of
information search behavior (Payne et al, 1978). What sort of information do
people actively seek, what scanning strategies do they adopt, and how much of
what they know comes casually from other people or is initiated from the
outside (e.g., media, tax preparers, solicitations)? This could be done in a
single time period by offering a large number of information pamphlets and
observing what is actually read. In a field experiment, various types of
information could be sent to people who would later be tested for their
understanding and use of that information. Retrospective reports of seach
activity would be useful but probably incomplete, and diary reports (as
suggested below) might be a reasonable way to track search behavior over
extended time periods.
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Longitudinal Studies
Longitudinal studies are also needed, examining tax behavior across a
year or several years (coupled with detailed cross-sectional surveys allowing
comparison of new, early, middle, and late taxpayers). One relatively
inexpensive procedure is a diary study, in which taxpayers are paid to keep a
diary of all tax-relevant behaviors. Surveys utilizing a panel design would
also be useful. The costs could be kept low by using some combination of
mailed and telephone questionnaires after initial personal interviews.
Field Tests of Interventions
Based on the conceptual work and results of surveys and other methods, it
would be possible to field test specific interventions. Manipulations of new
tax forms, instructions, information on penalties and probabilities,
information about fairness, andso forth could be tested in much the same way
that marketers "test market" their advertisements and new products. Even
deterrence could be test marketed by identifying a subgroup and convincing
them that their returns had particular probabilities of being audited, and
that they faced particular penalties. Quasiexperimental studies are also
possible in the form of time-series data on various tax behaviors as changes
occureed in the tax laws, audit practices, enforcement standards, and so
forth. I was particularly struck by hints of a "Bicentennial Effect" with a
drop in noncompliance in 1976, possibly caused by a (temporary) resurgence of
collective consciousness (Kinsey, 1984). It may be that one-time
quasiexperiments would be useful, especially if coupled with more
carefully-designed dependent measures such as the intensive surveys and
process-tracing studies already mentioned.
Conclusions
The major thrust of the suggested research is to further our basic
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understanding of taxpayer behavior, and to focus particularly on the way
taxpayers think about decisions relevant to tax compliance. Underlying this
approach is the assumption that attempts to deter noncompliance without
understanding the sources and processes of noncompliance are unlikely to
provide a satisfactory answer to the problem. Policymakers themselves tend
to choose strategies that are readily at hand, such as increasing IRS audits
and increasing penalties. However, we can choose from a much broader array
of interventions such as public information and education, new tax forms, tax
simplification, various forms of contact with the IRS, and so on.
We must also recognize that the situation is dynamic: tax laws change,
avoidance strategies arise from innovators, people adapt to fear-provoking
communication, economic conditions change, monitoring technologies change,
the economy changes from cash to electronic exchanges, people feel better or
worse about government, and so forth. We need research that will enable us
to understand taxpayers well enough to anticipate or incorporate some of
these changes, and that probably means a research rocess that itself is
adaptive.
The benefits to society include increased revenue, decreased costs of tax
administration, and a shift in the numbers of people who "frame" their
relationship to government in antagonistic vs. communal terms. It is not
desirable for a tax system to make criminals out of so many people that it
has to continually monitor, frighten, and punish them. It would be better if
people saw the value in paying their taxes, and that taxpaying behavior was
simple and clear.
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